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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of the murder of Dawna Quinn by her 
husband on May 23, 1984. On that day Fenton Quinn shot and 
killed Dawna Quinn and thereafter committed suicide. 
Both the Estate of Dawna Quinn and the Estate of Fenton 
Quinn were admitted to probate in the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. On or about August, 1984, Dawna 
Quinn's son, who had been appointed Personal Representative, 
filed a claim for her death against the Estate of Fenton Glade 
Quinn. Notice to creditors was published in the Fenton Quinn 
Estate and the claim was presented within the three month 
limitation set forth in § 75-3-803 U.C.A. (1953, amended 1975). 
Appellants do not challenge the timeliness of the claim. 
The Defendants disallowed the claim on December 4, 1984 (R. 
p.12) and at that time no request for clarification as to the 
claim or objection to its adequacy was addressed. The Complaint 
seeking recovery for Mrs. Quinn's murder was filed within the 60 
day time period prescribed in § 75-3-804 U.C.A. (1953, amended 
1975) on January 24, 1985 (R. p.2). 
Prior to the filing of an Answer in this action, the 
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on the same grounds as 
presented in this Appeal; that the claim, while timely, was 
somehow technically deficient. That Motion was denied June 24, 
1985. 
On December 21, 1985 the District Court granted Partial 
Summary Judgment (Appendix 6) in favor of the Plaintiffs and 
against the Defendants as to liability ruling that "Fenton Glade 
Quinn, deceased, did, on or about March 23, 1984, unlawfully take 
the life of Dawna W. Quinn (R. pp 132, 133). Thereafter the 
issue of damages was tried to a jury on December 16, 1986 and 
judgment entered in accordance with their findings in a total sum 
of $451,476.00 (Appendix 7, R. pp.365, 366). 
The Defendants do not appeal from the sufficiency or 
propriety of that judgment, but simply the technical sufficiency 
of the original claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Two claims and a Petition describing the Plaintiff's cause 
were timely submitted to the Defendants. These complied with §§ 
75-3-803 and 75-3-804 U.C.A. (1953, amended 1975). The claims 
were timely filed and delivered with descriptions of the nature 
of the claims. The claims were also signed by Kip Quinn, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna W. Quinn or his 
attorney; setting forth the full name and address as well as the 
amount claimed. The claims also designate, with reasonable 
specificity, the fact that it was based upon Mr. Quinn.'s murder 
of his wife (Appendix 1). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS FILED A VALID CLAIM WHICH WAS 
TIMELY AND INTOTAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
Section 75-3-803(a) specifies tha creditors' claims against 
an Estate are barred unless presented within three months of the 
_ o _ 
date of first publication of notice to creditors if that is 
given. The date of first publication of notice in the Estate of 
Fenton Glade Quinn was July 7, 1984. There is no contention that 
the claims, Appendix 1 and 2, were not filed within this 
prescribed period. 
Section 75-3-804 U.C.A. (1953/ amended 1975) sets forth the 
manner of presentation of claims (Appendix 8). 
Subsection (a) of that Statute states in part: 
"The claimant may deliver or mail to the Personal 
Representative a written statement of the claim 
indicating its basis, the name and address of the 
claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written 
statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by rule, 
with the clerk of the court . . . " Failure to describe 
correctly the security, the nature of any uncertainty, 
and the due date of a claim not yet due does not 
invalidate the presentation made, (emphasis added) 
The claims (Appendix 1 and 2) identified that it was being made 
by the Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna Quinn. 
They further state that the claim is based upon Mr. Quinn causing 
the death of Dawna Quinn; specifies designated amounts or as may 
otherwise be determined at trial; is signed by Kip Quinn, the 
appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna Quinn 
and his attorney; and gives the address of Kip Quinn and his 
attorney. The claims were mailed to Fenton Quinn, Jr., the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Fenton Quinn and filed 
with the Court, as well as mailed to the attorney representing 
that Estate, Kent Ludlow. All of the operative requirements of 
the Statute were contained in the claim. 
Defendants disallowed the claims on December 4, 1984. 
Section 75-3-806 U.C.A. (1953, amended 1975) provides that a 
Court proceeding must be commenced within 60 days after such 
disallowance. The Complaint in this action was filed January 24, 
1985 (R. p.2), well within the framework provided. 
The entire thrust of the Appellant's Brief in this case is 
not that the claim was not timely filed or set forth the 
requirements of the Statute, but that it must delineate the 
statutory basis for recovery (such as wrongful death and survival 
statutes) as well as all legal theories upon which the creditor 
relies. In fact, the Appellant urges this Court to judicially 
alter the express language of § 75-3-804, which specifically 
provides that such detail is unnecessary, and impose upon the 
creditor the requirement that the claim assume the form of a 
complaint or legal memoranda. Such is not now nor has it ever 
been the purpose of the claim requirement. In fact, within the 
time allowed, Defendant was served a Petition describing 
Plaintiff's claim in order to determine the sequence of death 
(Appendix 5). 
It goes without saying that the Appellants were acutely 
aware of the tragic circumstances which resulted in Mrs. Quinn's 
murder and Mr. Quinn's suicide. The Appellant's position relies 
on the mistaken assumption that the claim must specify the 
statutory basis upon which recovery is claimed rather than make a 
good faith attempt to notify the Personal Representative of the 
nature of the claim so that the Personal Representative may make 
a determination as to whether or not the claim should be allowed 
or rejected. 
The claim which was filed by Kip Quinn made no attempt to 
designate a specific statute as a source of recovery, but was 
notice of a claim for the unlawful murder of his mother as 
required by the Utah Probate Code. The Complaint filed sets 
forth causes of action under both the survival statute, § 78-11-7 
U.C.A. (1953) and § 78-11-12 U.C.A. (1953, amended 1977). Both 
of these statutes expressly provide that the cause of action is 
vested in the Personal Representative, Kip Quinn. Since the 
cause of action is vested by statute with the Personal 
Representative, the claim was properly signed and filed by the 
Personal Representative on behalf of the heirs. 
Defendant never requested a clarification or explanation of 
the claims in their denials (Appendix 3 and 4) and certainly knew 
what happened and the surrounding basis for its submission. 
The purpose of a claim is to expedite the efficient 
administration of the Estate and collection of just claims. The 
Editorial Board Comment to Part 8 of the Utah Probate Code, 
U.C.A. Vol. 8A, 1978, pp. 185, 186 provides: 
"A need for uniformity of law regarding creditors1 
claims against estates is especially strong. Commercial 
and consumer credit depends upon effecient collection 
procedures. The cost of credit is pushed up by the cost 
of credit life insurance which becomes a practical 
necessity for lenders unwilling to bear the expense of 
understanding or utilizing the cumbersome collection 
procedures found in 50 codes of probate. 
The sections which follow facilitate collection of 
claims against decedents in several ways. First _a_ 
simple written statement mailed to the Personal 
Representative is a sufficient 'claim1."(emphasis added) 
In Tangren v. Snyder, 13 Utah 2d 95, 368 P.2d 711 (1962) an 
attorney filed a claim on behalf of the Personal Representative 
of a foreign estate and the claim was challenged on the basis 
that the representative had not qualified in this state (and was 
therefore not able to bring an action to enforce the claim) in 
that the Affidavit did not specify why the foreign 
representative, himself, was making the claim rather than the 
Personal Representative, This Court stated, at Page 97: 
"We are of the opinion that the statutory requirements 
of the contents of the claim and affidavit in support 
thereof should be liberally construed and that such 
statutes were, as stated in United States Fidelity and 
Guarantee Company v. Keck (citation omitted) 'not 
intended to make it easier to avoid payment of a just 
claim, but were intended to make a claimant set forth 
his claim with such particularity that the executor or 
administrator in passing upon it would be fully advised 
as to just what was claimed • . ." 
In Peterson v. Jones, 15 Utah 2d 121, 396 P.2d 748 (1964) a 
lower court dismissed the Complaint because there had been no 
prior determination of heirship. This Court reversed determining 
there was no requirement to determine the heirs prior to the 
filing of a claim or commencing an action. Often, in fact, this 
would be impossible because of the strict time limitations set 
forth in the Probate Code. 
The Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna Quinn, 
her son, filed claims in this action because the Personal 
Representatives is one of the entities to whom the claim belongs 
and who is statutorial authorized to pursue it. In Switzer v. 
Reynolds, Utah, 606 P.2d 244 (1980) the proper party for bringing 
an action under the Wrongful Death Act, § 78-11-7 U.C.A. (1953) 
is: 
"The actions must be brought in the name of the persons 
upon whom the right is conferred by statute." 
- 6 -
The Court went on further to add: 
"Whether the action be prosecuted by the Personal 
Representative or one or more of the heirs, it is for 
the benefit of all the heirs and all heirs are bound 
thereby." 
As dictated by this authority and the statute, the Personal 
Representative is the statutory trustee for all of the heirs and 
since the heirs need not be named as specific parties in the 
action itself, Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Company, Utah, 228 
P.557 (1924) they are certainly not an essential element of the 
claim itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs in this action filed an initial claim against 
this Estate for $350,000.00 by mailing to the Personal 
Representative and his attorney (Appendix 2). Later that month, 
that claim was amended to increase the amount to $650,000.00 
(Appendix 1) and on August 10, 1984 a Petition for Order 
Determining that Fenton Quinn predeceased Dawna Quinn was sent to 
the Appellants which specifically described the act of murder 
upon which the Plaintiff's claim was founded (Appendix 5). Both 
of the claims were disallowed on December 4, 1984 (Appendix 3 and 
4) and no request for clarification or indication that there was 
any uncertainty or deficiency with the claims was indicated. 
It is not now, nor has it ever been, the intent of the 
Probate Code to turn claims into hypertechnical dissertations. 
The claims which were filed were timely and set forth each and 
every requirement under the statutes and Appellants1 sole cause 
for relief requests this Court to judicially amend §§ 75-3-803 
and 75-3-804 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). Such an action would be 
one for the legislature, not the Appellate Courts. 
DATED this 14th day of March*^198&'. 
Robert Felton 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copy of 
the foregoing RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF by United States first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, to B. Kent Ludlow and Chris Schmutz, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the Jstyttyf dpy of llajc&ti^/ISjiQ . 
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A P P E N D I X 
EXHIBIT A 
Robert Felton, 1056 
George H. Speciale, 3053 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND POR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
FENTON GLADE QUINN, 
Deceased. 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
P84-547 
* * * * * * * * * 
Claim is hereby made against the Estate of Fenton G. Quinn 
by Kip Quinn, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna W. 
Quinn for and on behalf of the Estate of said Dawna W. Quinn for 
personal injury. The basis of this claim is that on or about May 
24, 1984, Fenton G. Quinn caused the death of Dawna W. Quinn and 
that said action was done in a willful and malicious manner with 
the premeditated attempt to cause the death of Dawna W. Quinn. 
The amount of this claim is for $650,000.00 or such other amount 
as may be determined at trial, by the Court, or otherwise as a 
result of Decedent's Actions. 
DATED this ^3C> day of August, 1984. 
Kip QuJAnrt j ' 
7747 Biscayne Dr. 
i y v V x 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
1 
oA ki"t(iG^ 
S P E C I A L E &L F E L T O N 
Suite 220 CFS Financial Canter 
324 South State Street 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111-2303 
(801) 359-9216 
August 6f 1984 
Fenton Quinn, Jr. 
Personal Representative 
Estate of Fenton Quinn 
2601 West Rustic Road 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
RE: Claim regarding the Estate of Fenton G. Quinn, Deceased 
Dear Mr. Quinn: 
Would you please consider this letter as a claim for and on 
behalf of the Estate of Davna Quinn for reimbursement and damages 
as follows: 
1. $50,000 as evidenced by the Trust Deed Note dated March 
27, 1984 to Capital City Bank. A copy of the Trust Deed Note 
evidencing this indebtedness is attached to this claim. 
2. $300,000 for the felonious and wrongful death of Davna 
Quinn by Fenton Quinn. 
3. Proceeds of any bonds, life insurance policies or other 
contractual arrangements designating Fenton Quinn as beneficiary. 
I would appreciate it if you would record this claim for 
your records. If you need any clarification regarding this claim 
please contact me and I vill forvard you the information I 
have. Also, you should be made avare that we have filed the 
claim for the personal injury with United Pacific Insurance 
Company which maintain the home owner's policy. I am including a 
copy of that policy for your information. 
I would appreciate it if you would also file a claim for 
this damage with United Pacific Reliance Insurance Company, P.O. 
Box 6198, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
RF/tp 
Enclosures 
cc: B. Kent'Ludlow 
2 
NAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned do hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Fenton Quinn, Jr. 2601 West Rustic Rd., South Jordan, Utah 84065 
and to Kent Ludlow, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 34 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the ^ \ day of August, 
1984. 
^ J" f" > • 
V X I ' I A 
~nnO£# 
P£C 4- 1984 
B. Kent Ludlow (2010) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys at Law 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
H. Dtxo 
nt 
teos. ojo oisi. Court 
v Deputy Cterk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
FENTON GLADE QUINN, 
Deceased, 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF 
CLAIM 
Probate No. P84-547 
TO: Kip Quinn, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Dawna W. Quinn: 
The undersigned, as Personal Representative of the above 
estate, hereby disallows all of your alleged claim for 
$650,000.00 as set forth on Exhibit "A" attached and hereby 
incorporated herein. 
Failure to protest the disallowance by filing a petition 
for allowance or commencing a proceeding within sixty days 
after vhe mailing of this notice shall result in your claim or 
the disallowed portion being forever barred. 
Fenton G. Quinn/" Jr. 
2601 West Rustic Road 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
Telephone: (801) 254-1847 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the above 
Notice of Disallowance of Claim to the Claimant, Kip Quinn, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna W. Quinn, and to 
Claimant's Attorneys, Robert Felton and George H. Speciale, on 
the day of fr)£&4fti&v' # 1984, by depositing i t 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Kip Quinn 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of Dawna W. Quinn 
7747 Biscayne Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Robert Felton and 
George H. Speciale 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
-2-
B. Kent Ludlow (2010) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys at Law 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
DEC 4-1984 
H. 0 i x W ^ S ^ ^ 7 l 
Oy - V * ' f (/Deputy cTerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
FENTON GLADE QUINN, 
Deceased. 
) 
) NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF 
) CLAIM 
) 
) Probate No. P84-547 
) 
) 
TO: Kip Quinn, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Dawna W. Quinn: 
The undersigned, as Personal Representative of the above 
estate, hereby disallows all of your alleged claims totaling 
$350,000.00 plus the proceeds of any bonds, life insurance 
policies or other contractual arrangements designating Fenton 
Quinn as beneficiary as set forth on Exhibit "A" attached and 
hereby incorporated herein. 
Failure to protest the disallowance by filing a petition 
for allowance or commencing a proceeding within sixty days 
after the mailing of this notice shall result in your claim or 
the disallowed portion being forever barred. 
Fenton G. Quiijh, Jr. ~f 
2601 West Rustic Road 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
Telephone: (801) 254-1847 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the above 
Notice of Disallowance of Claim to the Claimant, Kip Quinn, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna W. Quinn, and to 
Claimants Attorneys, Robert Felton and George H. Speciale, on 
the V—day of /JjJZwJLu' * 1984, by depositing it 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Kip Quinn 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of Dawna W. Quinn 
7747 Biscayne Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Robert Felton and 
George H. Speciale 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
^dUi/^J^t^J 
-2-
By ' 
George H. Speciale 
Robert Felton 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
5 Triad Center - Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
(801) 359-9216 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
FENTON GLADE QUINN 
Deceased. 
PETITION FOR ORDER 
DETERMINING THAT FENTON 
QUINN PREDECEASED DAWNA 
W. QUINN 
Probate No. P-84-547 
(Judge Wilkinson) 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Kip Quirtn, Peronal Representative of the Estate of Dawna W. 
Quinn, by and through his attorneys, Robert Felton and George H. 
Speciale, hereby petition this Court for an Order and Judgement 
determining that for purposes of determination of heirship and 
distribution of the Estate of Fenton Glade Quinn that he 
predeceased his wife, Dawna W. Quinn. 
As grounds for this Petition it is respectfully submitted as 
follows: 
1. Fenton Glade Quinn died May 24, 1984 of a self-inflicted 
gunshot wound of the head. 
2. Dawna W. Quinn died May 24, 1984 as a result of a gun 
shot wound of the head intentionally inflicted by Fenton Glade 
Quinn with the intent to cause the death of Dawna W. Quinn. 
3« Fenton G. Quinn was the surviving spouse of Dawna W. 
Quinn immediately subsequent to her death on May 24, 1984. 
Pursuant to Section 75-2-804, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, 1975 the Estate of Fenton G. Quinn passes as if he had 
predeceased Dawna W. Quinn* 
C 
UOm WHCItEfOFK, Petitioner requests this Court that a 
be held and that notice be given as provided by law and the.* 
Court enter a judgment and order as follows: 
!• Fenton G. Quinn, the surviving spouse of Dawna W. Quii.: 
did intentionally kill Dawna Quinn on May 24, 1984. 
2. Under the provisions of Section 75-2-804, Utah COL. 
Annotated (1953 as amended 1975) Fenton G. Quinn, for the 
purposes of distribution of the estate and determination of 
heirship, predeceased Dawna W. Quinn* 
3, That Fenton G. Quinn has no right of survivorship as to 
any jointly held property or property held in any form of co-
ownership with survivorship incidence. 
4* That any bond, life insurance policy or other 
contractual arrangement naming Fenton G. Quinn as beneficiary is 
payable as though Fenton G. Quinn had predeceased Dawna W. Quinn* 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just in the premises. 
DATED this ^fi day of August, 1984. 
Robert Felton 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned do hereby certify that a copy of the 
foregoing pleading was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Nielson & 
Senior, B. Kent Ludlow, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
DATED this y day of August, 1984. 
j / 
r c * r ^ ~ , 
... - it^tftf FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
' "-'•••-
v
' Salt Laka Coimtv U?.?.h 
Robert Felton, 10-^ 6* 
G e o r g e H. S p e c i a i e ^ H 5 $ -
5 T r i a d C e n t e r \ t 
Suite 585 •*.% \^, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 '•" 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
KIP QUINN, Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of 
Dawna W. Quinn and THE ESTATE 
OF DAWNA W. QUINN, 
OJPMJV Cterk 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
THE ESTATE OF FENTON GLADE 
QUINN and FENTON QUINN, JR., 
the Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Fenton Glade 
Quinn, 
Defendants 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-85-165A 
Judge John Rokich 
* * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John 
Rokich, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 3rd day of 
December, 1985 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
Robert Felton appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants were represented by Joy L. Sanders of the law offices 
of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU. B. Kent Ludlow of the law 
offices of NIELS0N & SENIOR also appeared on behalf of the 
Defendants. 
The matter before the Court was the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment made on behalf of the Plaintiffs pursuant to 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the Defendants 
were, as a matter of law, liable to the Plaintiffs on the ground 
~r\n1u.i 
that there was no genuine issue of fact that Fenton Glade Quinn 
did unlawfully take the life of Dawna W. Quinn. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants argued the matter 
before the Court and the Court, having heretofore made a ruling 
as to the negligence allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint took the 
matter under advisement. The Court having heard the arguments of 
counsel, having reviewed the pleadings and having read the 
depositions which were published in support of the Motion and for 
good cause appearing now enters its Order as follows: 
1. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to the liability of the Defendants in this 
action. 
2. Fenton Glade Quinn, Deceased, did, on or about May 23, 
1984 unlawfully take the life of Dawna W. Quinn. 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby awarded Partial Summary 
Judgment against the Defendants as to the issue of liability. 
All issues as to the amount of damages are reserved until 
trial. 
DATED this £ / day of December, 1985. 
By t h e C o u r t : 
?JL A s&AJ. 
Juage John Rokich 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY ijmr 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of t$F6utyC,8rk 
foregoing PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT postage prepaid, to B. Kent 
Robert Felton, 1056 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FES 9 I toNi* 
H» DIXON MIND 
iji^inst. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
KIP QUINN, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Dawna W. Quinn and THE 
ESTATE OF DAWNA W. QUINN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
THE ESTATE OF FENTON GLADE 
QUINN and FENTON QUINN, JR., 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Fenton Glade 
Quinn, 
Defendants 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No . C85-165A 
Judge John Rokich 
* * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for jury trial on the 16th day of 
December, 1986, the Honorable John Rokich presiding. 
Robert Felton appeared for and on behalf of the Plaintiffs 
and the Defendants were represented by Richard Hincks and Chris 
Schmutz. 
Upon conclusion of the evidence the Court required the jury 
to return a special verdict pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The jury did thereafter return its special 
verdict and in accordance therewith judgment is hereby entered in 
favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as follows: 
1. Judgment for economic loss 
2 . Judgment for funeral expenses 
$101,293 .00 
$3,200 .00 
3. Judgment for value of loss of society, 
love, companionship, affection and protection 
TOTAL 
$346,983 .00 
$451,476.00 
Signed under the direction of the Court and In accordance 
with the verdict of the jury this fc? day of ^ SEBBKB?7, 1987 . 
By 
4 ^ <W/£ 
75-3-804 PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
Where claims were barred for failure fense of general statute of limitations 
to file on time, administratrix was with- available to administratrix in action by 
out power to pay them, and any money creditor. Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, v 
paid thereon would be considered to come 111 U. 521, 184 P. 2d 237. 
from her personal funds, and could not Statute requiring presentation of 
be considered as deduction from inheri- claims within time stated in notice was 
tance tax. Jones v. State Tax Comm., not a bar to action to impress judgment 
99 U. 373,104 P. 2d 210. lien on property, where complaint alleged 
Claims had to be filed, after proper no- that property had been transferred to 
tice, within time limit of statute, or be defraud creditors, and that property was 
forever barred. Jones v. State Tax held in trust for defendant. Moulton v. 
Comm., 99 U. 373, 104 P. 2d 210. Morgan, 115 U. 119, 202 P. 2d 723. 
Purpose of statute requiring presenta- . 
tion of claims within time stated in notice T i m e limitations. 
was to require publication of notice to Demand against decedent's estate as-
creditors so as to shorten limitation pe- serting that property was sold to claim-
riod, and not to lengthen it because of ant by deceased and asking the court to 
neglect on part of personal representa- order the administrator to make a suita-
tive or delay on part of creditor. Gray ble conveyance was a petition for spe-
Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 U. 521, 184 cific performance of a contract to convey 
P. 2d 237. property and was not subject to the one-
Notice to creditors by administratrix, year time limitation for presenting 
indicating that claims against estate claims against an estate. In re Estate of 
could be filed before certain date, did not Sharp, 537 P. 2d 1034. 
constitute waiver or abandonment of de-
75-3-804. Manner of presentation of claims.—(1) Claims against a 
decedent's estate may be presented as follows: 
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative 
a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and 
address of the claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written 
statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk 
of the court. The claim is deemed presented on the first to occur of re-
ceipt of the written statement of claim by the personal representative, 
or the filing of the claim with the court. If a claim is not yet due, the 
date when it will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent 
or unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty shall be stated. If the 
claim is secured, the security shall be described. Failure to describe cor-
rectly the security, the nature of any uncertainty, and the due date of a 
claim not yet due does not invalidate the presentation made. 
(b) The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal 
representative in any court where the personal representative may be 
subjected to jurisdiction to obtain payment of his claim against the es-
tate, but the commencement of the proceeding must occur within the 
time limited for presenting the claim. No presentation of claim is re-
quired in regard to matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent 
which were pending at the time of his death. 
(2) If a claim is presented under subsection (1) (a) above, no pro-
ceeding thereon may be commenced more than 60 days after the per-
sonal representative has mailed a notice of disallowance; but, in the 
case of a claim which is not presently due or which is contingent or 
unliquidated, the personal representative may consent to an extension 
of the 60-day period, or to avoid injustice the court, on petition, may 
order an extension of the 60-day period, but in no event shall the exten-
sion run beyond the applicable statute of limitations. 
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